Meno Annotated edition by Plato Benjamin Jowett Politics Social Sciences eBooks
Download As PDF : Meno Annotated edition by Plato Benjamin Jowett Politics Social Sciences eBooks 
Meno is a Socratic dialogue composed by Plato. It attempts to determine the definition of virtue, or arete, meaning virtue in general, rather than particular virtues, such as justice or temperance. The first part of the work is written in the Socratic dialectical style and Meno is reduced to confusion or aporia. In response to Meno's paradox (or the learner's paradox), however, Socrates introduces positive ideas the immortality of the soul, the theory of knowledge as recollection (anamnesis), which Socrates demonstrates by posing a mathematical puzzle to one of Meno's slaves, the method of hypothesis, and, in the final lines, the distinction between knowledge and true belief.
This edition has formatted for your , with an active table of contents. It has also been extensively annotated, with additional information about Meno and also Plato, including an overview, characters, dialogue, relation to Protagoras, and biographical information.
Meno Annotated edition by Plato Benjamin Jowett Politics Social Sciences eBooks
Conventionally, the Meno is of course taken to be a profound work on epistemology: Meno puts forth a devastating "paradox" calling into question the very possibility of learning (80d), which Socrates can only defuse with a sophisticated and portentous theory of knowledge as recollection that is to become a linchpin of the mature Platonic worldview.I believe that this reading of the Meno, and Plato generally, is a distortion caused by the unwarranted projection onto Plato of the nowadays all-pervasive conception that all philosophy must be a sober quest for truth. Indeed, if we listen to Plato's own words we see that, far from claiming to have dealt with a momentous problem of epistemology, he is instead at pains to ridicule the problem and belittle his own solution:
"We ought not to listen to this sophistical argument about the impossibility of enquiry: for it will make us idle; and is sweet only to the sluggard; but the other saying will make us active and inquisitive." (81d) "Some things I have said of which I am not altogether confident. But that we shall be better and braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to enquire, than we should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no knowing and no use in seeking to know what we do not know---that is a theme upon which I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of my power." (86b-c)
In other words, the important thing is not epistemology or truth but the kind of life we ought to live: active, brave, and inquisitive.
I think this misunderstood point is crucial for understanding several other misinterpreted passages in Plato, particularly regarding science. Consider for example Plato's condemnations of experimental and empirical science in the Timaeus (68d and 91d). It would be a mistake to interpret these passages as signs of the backwardness of Plato's conception of science, as is often done. The point Plato is making is simply this: it is good to think and come up with imaginative theories. Now, some people will try to deflate this enterprise by pointing out that these fancy theories fail to agree with actual, empirical observations. These people miss the point. Beautiful theories are an end in themselves; observations be damned. Fools with no imagination think they are being clever when they try to disprove theories by observations, but they prove nothing besides their own inability to understand the purpose of philosophy. What is the point in ruining a child's happy play by pointing out that the stick he is holding is not really a sword? This is all these fools do, and they imagine themselves superior for it. These are the people Plato is attacking in the Timaeus.
Again in the Republic we have the same pattern: "we will let be the things in the heavens, if we are to have a part in the true science of astronomy," says Plato, and the truth-mob jump to chastise him so quickly that they forget to read the second half of the sentence: "and so convert to right use from uselessness that natural indwelling intelligence of the soul" (530c). Again the point is clear: the purpose of science is not to amass truths but "to lead the best part of the soul up to the contemplation of what is best among realities" (532c).
Thus Plato's aversion to empirical science is not a matter of epistemology but simply a practical judgement as to what type of philosophy leads to a richer and more satisfying life of the mind. Empiricism spoils many fun theories and offers nothing in their place but dry and boring catalogues of facts. But Plato likes beautiful theories, whether true or not, and he dislikes catalogues of facts. So he condemns empiricism for this reason---in order to stay true to the ideal laid down in the Meno: to be active, brave, and inquisitive.
Product details
|
Tags : Meno (Annotated) - Kindle edition by Plato, Benjamin Jowett. Download it once and read it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Use features like bookmarks, note taking and highlighting while reading Meno (Annotated).,ebook,Plato, Benjamin Jowett,Meno (Annotated),LITERARY COLLECTIONS Ancient & Classical,PHILOSOPHY History & Surveys Ancient & Classical
People also read other books :
- Nocturnal Academy 7 School of Thought edition by Ethan Somerville Children eBooks
- Antología Relatos de Amor 01 Spanish Edition edition by Grace Lloper Literature Fiction eBooks
- France and the Dreyfus Affair A Documentary History eBook Michael Burns
- Thiruppavai Goda Gita edition by Swetha Sundaram Religion Spirituality eBooks
- Smokin'!!! The Beginners Guide for Cooking Low and Slow edition by Larry Hendler Cookbooks Food Wine eBooks
Meno Annotated edition by Plato Benjamin Jowett Politics Social Sciences eBooks Reviews
Conventionally, the Meno is of course taken to be a profound work on epistemology Meno puts forth a devastating "paradox" calling into question the very possibility of learning (80d), which Socrates can only defuse with a sophisticated and portentous theory of knowledge as recollection that is to become a linchpin of the mature Platonic worldview.
I believe that this reading of the Meno, and Plato generally, is a distortion caused by the unwarranted projection onto Plato of the nowadays all-pervasive conception that all philosophy must be a sober quest for truth. Indeed, if we listen to Plato's own words we see that, far from claiming to have dealt with a momentous problem of epistemology, he is instead at pains to ridicule the problem and belittle his own solution
"We ought not to listen to this sophistical argument about the impossibility of enquiry for it will make us idle; and is sweet only to the sluggard; but the other saying will make us active and inquisitive." (81d) "Some things I have said of which I am not altogether confident. But that we shall be better and braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to enquire, than we should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no knowing and no use in seeking to know what we do not know---that is a theme upon which I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of my power." (86b-c)
In other words, the important thing is not epistemology or truth but the kind of life we ought to live active, brave, and inquisitive.
I think this misunderstood point is crucial for understanding several other misinterpreted passages in Plato, particularly regarding science. Consider for example Plato's condemnations of experimental and empirical science in the Timaeus (68d and 91d). It would be a mistake to interpret these passages as signs of the backwardness of Plato's conception of science, as is often done. The point Plato is making is simply this it is good to think and come up with imaginative theories. Now, some people will try to deflate this enterprise by pointing out that these fancy theories fail to agree with actual, empirical observations. These people miss the point. Beautiful theories are an end in themselves; observations be damned. Fools with no imagination think they are being clever when they try to disprove theories by observations, but they prove nothing besides their own inability to understand the purpose of philosophy. What is the point in ruining a child's happy play by pointing out that the stick he is holding is not really a sword? This is all these fools do, and they imagine themselves superior for it. These are the people Plato is attacking in the Timaeus.
Again in the Republic we have the same pattern "we will let be the things in the heavens, if we are to have a part in the true science of astronomy," says Plato, and the truth-mob jump to chastise him so quickly that they forget to read the second half of the sentence "and so convert to right use from uselessness that natural indwelling intelligence of the soul" (530c). Again the point is clear the purpose of science is not to amass truths but "to lead the best part of the soul up to the contemplation of what is best among realities" (532c).
Thus Plato's aversion to empirical science is not a matter of epistemology but simply a practical judgement as to what type of philosophy leads to a richer and more satisfying life of the mind. Empiricism spoils many fun theories and offers nothing in their place but dry and boring catalogues of facts. But Plato likes beautiful theories, whether true or not, and he dislikes catalogues of facts. So he condemns empiricism for this reason---in order to stay true to the ideal laid down in the Meno to be active, brave, and inquisitive.
0 Response to "[5EB]⇒ Download Free Meno Annotated edition by Plato Benjamin Jowett Politics Social Sciences eBooks"
Post a Comment